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Aristotle in books M and N of his Metaphysics, attacks the Form-numbers or the so called 
eidetic numbers and differentiates them from the monadic or unitary, i.e. the mathematical, 
numbers, namely the ordinary numbers which are addible to one another (sumblētoi) and 
composed of undifferentiated units (monades). Syrianus in his Commentary on Aristot-
le’s Metaphysics defends the existence of eidetic numbers and justifies their necessity, by 
following a line of argument which puts forward the main characteristics of their divine 
and immaterial nature. In parallel he analyzes and explains the ontological status of math-
ematical numbers in a way which reveals that they have a kind of separate existence. This 
paper attempts to bring to the fore the most salient aspects of this argumentation and sets 
out to show how a neoplatonic Platonist such as Syrianus, understood the nature not only 
of the Form-numbers, but also of the mathematical numbers, through the transmission 
of the relevant Platonic tradition, especially with regard to Plato’s unwritten doctrines.
168 Melina G. Mouzala  / University of Patras /
I. Aristotle’s classification of number in Metaphysics M6
Aristotle in passage 1080 a 12–35 of his Metaphysics states that it would be well to turn 
once again to the investigation of the problems connected with numbers and more specif-
ically with the theory that numbers are separate substances and primary causes of beings.1 
He then proceeds with the assumption that if number is a kind of nature, and its essence 
is nothing else but that very thing, namely that it exists as a number, as some thinkers 
maintain, then it follows necessarily that indeed there must be something of number 
which is primary and something else which is next in succession (echomenon) and so on, 
each one being other and distinct in kind from anything else. In terms of the manner 
in which units are connected with each other within the number, Aristotle recognizes 
three disjunctive possibilities and makes the following threefold division: either i) the 
aforementioned otherness in kind applies directly to units, with the consequence that 
any unit is non-combinable (asumblētos2) with any other unit; or ii) all units are directly 
successive (euthus ephechsēs) and any unit is combinable with any other unit, as they say 
is the case with mathematical number (for in mathematical number no unit is in any way 
different from another);3 or iii) some units are combinable and others not.
Aristotle clarifies within an extended bracket that in the last case if after one 
comes first two and then three and so on for the rest of the numbers, and the units in 
each number are combinable (those in the first two, for example, being combinable 
between themselves, and those in the first three among themselves, and so on with the 
other numbers), but the units in the original Two, in the Form of two (duas), are non- 
combinable with those in the original Three, in the Form of three (trias), and similarly 
with the other numbers in succession. In this last case after One, there is a distinct Two 
not including the first One, and a Three not including the Two, and the other numbers 
in a similar way. On the contrary in mathematical number after one comes two, name-
ly another one added to the one before, and then three, namely another one added to 
those two before, and the remaining numbers likewise. In passage 1080 a 35–37 Aristotle 
states that one kind of number must be such as was first described (namely all the units 
non-combinable), another like the sort spoken of by mathematicians, and the third is that 
mentioned last. Furthermore in passage 1080 a 37–b 4 he adds that these numbers must 
exist in separation from things, or not in separation, but in sensible things (in the sense 
that sensible things are composed of numbers which are present in them), – either some 
of them and not others, or all of them.4
1  In general outline I follow the translation  by Dillon & O’Meara (2006).
2  Wilson (1904: 250) notes that when Aristotle attacks the Idea-numbers, he speaks of them as ἀσύμβλητοι 
ἀριθμοί, and it is exactly on their numerical side and not as mere Ideas that the epithet belongs to them and is 
relevant; most of his criticisms relate to their numerical aspect as Ideas of numbers solely.
3  In this last sentence I follow the translation by Annas (1976; repr. 1999).
4  I follow the translation  by Dillon & O’Meara (2006) with slight changes.
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The main problem which emerges from passage 1080 a 15–37 is to decide if Aristo-
tle presents the three kinds of number described in lines 18–35 as divisions of the class 
established in lines 17–18. Ross5 notes that the sentence is irregular in structure; he points 
out that Aristotle begins (l. 17) by stating what looks as if it were to be the first of a series 
of alternative hypotheses about the nature of numbers, but he proceeds to state three 
possible forms of this one hypothesis, differing in the view they take of the nature of units 
(ll. 18, 20, 23) and recurs to numbers only in l. 35. I agree with Tarán6 that there is a break 
in l. 18, in the sentence which begins in l. 17, where ἤτοι has been left without a comple-
ment. In my opinion, ἤτοι in fact has not a complement, because it is syntactically co-or-
dinate only with «ἀνάγκη δ’» in line 1080 a 15. After the sentence «ἀνάγκη δ’… ἤτοι…
ἕκαστον»(ll. 15–18), there comes the syntactic structure «καὶ τοῦτο ἢ…, ἢ εὐθὺς ἐφεξῆς 
…· ἢ τὰς μὲν συμβλητὰς τὰς δὲ μή…» (ll. 18–23). So there is only one hypothesis about 
the nature of numbers and Ross is correct to state that Aristotle presents three possible 
forms of one hypothesis.
These three different kinds of number are recognized in terms of the different ways in 
which the units are related in each of them. If they are all divisions of the number referred 
to in passage 1080 a 17–18, in which there is something prior and something posterior, and 
these ordered numerical elements are distinct in form, then all three kinds of number 
presented in 1080 a 18–35 are incomparable. If this is the case, the question is, how can 
Aristotle identify the second kind of numbers, namely incomparable numbers the units of 
which are all comparable, with mathematical numbers? Given that in 1081 a 5–7 he admits 
that if all the units are comparable or combinable and undifferentiated, then there is only 
one type of number, the mathematical, and it is obvious that for Aristotle, numbers of 
which all the units are comparable cannot be incomparable.7
In my opinion, Ross’s8 view is correct when he states that in 1080 a 20, Aristotle 
expresses the belief in incomparable numbers with units all comparable. But I agree 
with Tarán9 that Ross10 is wrong when he contends that Aristotle confuses incomparable 
numbers, the units of which are all comparable, with mathematical numbers. Never-
theless, I consider that Tarán11 is also wrong when he claims it improbable that Aristotle, 
having mentioned in 1080 a 18–20 the incomparable units, went then into a digression 
concerning the nature of the units as such, in which the question of the different kinds 
of numbers was lost sight of; he admits that such an interpretation would make sense in 
5  Ross (1924: Vol. II, 426).
6  Tarán (1978: 89).
7  Cf. Arist. Metaph. 1081 a 17–21; see also Cherniss (1944: Vol. I., 514 ); Tarán (1978:  85).
8  Ross (1924:Vol. II, 426 ).
9  Tarán (1978:  85).
10  Ross (1924:Vol. II, 426).
11  Tarán (1978:  86).
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itself.12 It is worthwhile mentioning that Wilson13 has proposed an interpretation which 
makes possible such a digression. He states that in this ordered series described in passage 
1080 a 17–18, the numerical elements must be ἀσύμβλητοι, but that there are two possi-
ble cases. Either the elements are the units, and then, if these have an order of prior and 
posterior, they must be all incomparable, or the elements are the numbers. If this is the 
case, then this series can only be formed by the third kind of numbers described by Aris-
totle in passage 1080 a 23–30 and 33–35.14 
In any case I agree with Tarán that Aristotle’s classification of number is intended 
to attack the diverse Platonistic doctrines of number and “enables him to argue that if 
numbers actually exist apart from the sensibles, they must belong to one or another of 
the three categories of incomparable numbers he has set up, all of which he believes to 
be impossible”15. Moreover, although I completely agree with Tarán that the ἢ in passage 
1080 a 35 is corrective,16 I believe there is another possible explanation which sheds light 
on the logical sequence and ordering of the Aristotelian thoughts in passage 1080 a 17–37. 
The sense in which Aristotle uses the reference to the mathematical number in passages 
1080 a 21 and 1080 a 36 is not the same. In the first passage he reserves the division which 
starts from 1080 a 18 and mentions the second kind of numbers which are incomparable, 
namely numbers which have all their units combinable. Nevertheless, he says that this is 
the kind of numbers they, i.e. some other Platonists, claim it is the mathematical number, 
and by that he means the other Platonists with the diverse doctrines about mathemat-
ical numbers.17 But when he returns to the discussion in passage 1080 a 35–37, he does 
no more reserves the same classification which begins in lines 17–18, because now he 
no longer refers to the second kind of incomparable numbers which he mentioned in 
passage 1080 a 21. He refers only to the sort of number spoken of by the mathematicians, 
and this number according to Aristotle is an absolutely comparable number with all its 
units comparable.18 
12  Aristotle could have connected the numbers which have an ordering relation and are distinct in form 
only with the first kind of number, referred to in passage 1080 a 18–19, in which the distinction in form applies 
directly to the units, since for him the next kind of numbers, namely those which have all the units comparable, 
are mathematical numbers, and these numbers are comparable, i.e. they are not distinct in form. Also, the third 
kind of number is not an instance in which the distinction in form applies directly to the units, because while 
the units of an Ideal number could not be combined with those of another, the combination of units is possible 
within the number itself. 
13  Wilson (1904: 253).
14  The disadvantage of Wilson’s interpretation is that he does not include in his treatment all the three kinds 
of numbers which constitute divisions of the class established in 1080 a 17–18, since he omits the kind of number 
referred to in passage 1080 a 20–23.
15  Tarán (1978: 87).
16  Tarán (1978:  89).
17  The sentence «οἷον λέγουσιν εἶναι τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμὸν» (1080 a 21) refers to incomparable 
numbers with the units all being comparable. Tarán (1978:  86) is wrong when he says that it refers merely to 
the units’ being all comparable, and not to incomparable numbers as such.
18  Cf. Tarán (1978:  89–90), who offers a different justification.
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II. Syrianus on the nature of Form-numbers or eidetic19 numbers
Syrianus20 notes that the first distinction made by Aristotle in passage 1080 a 17–18 is 
defectively stated, but yet it is verily said for it necessarily follows that, if essential Number 
(Number itself) exists as a nature distinct from things that are subject to counting, either 
each following number differs from its predecessor in form or it does not so differ. He 
adds that Aristotle seems to pass over this alternative, “or it does not so differ”. In my view 
it is obvious why Aristotle passes over this alternative, since if each number did not differ 
from its predecessor in form, then all numbers would be one united or unique number. 
Furthermore, Syrianus states that the subsequent distinctions involving types of 
unit are all superfluous and disorientate or misdirect the enquiry; for if those men had 
postulated that separable numbers had their being in a quantity of units, it would have 
been proper to raise the question against them as to whether all the units are non-com-
binable or whether they are all indistinguishable or if some are indistinguishable and 
others distinguishable and non-combinable.21 But according to those who maintain that 
numbers are separable, he adds,22 the numbers concerned are partless and devoid of 
quantity and discerned as immanent within divine Forms, at least those of them that are 
separable from the cosmos. So according to Syrianus, it would not make sense to raise 
such questions, as if each separable number consists of a quantity of units.
Syrianus claims that from the distinctions Aristotle makes in passage 1080 a 17–23 and 
a 35–b 4, only the first and the last turn out to be substantial (pragmateiōdeis). He then 
states that he chooses from the first one the alternative that the different numbers are 
distinct in form, or rather that they are distinct Forms, for the pure and unsullied Forms 
are not separate from numbers.23 What we can infer from the words of Syrianus is that he 
completely identifies Forms with numbers and that different numbers are distinct Forms. 
These are partless and devoid of quantity, so it is quite meaningless for someone to speak 
of the units in the case of essential Number or eidetic number in the same way as we speak 
19  According to Wilson (1904: 257) “it seems always assumed, perhaps without a sufficient examination of 
the evidence, that εἰδητικὸς ἀριθμὸς was the special designation of the Idea-numbers as such. …That number from 
which ῾mathematical number᾿ was distinguished was then simply the ῾Ideas᾿, ἰδέαι or εἴδη , of number, in true 
reference to number. If a collective expression for the εἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν, parallel to the collective μαθηματικὸς 
ἀριθμὸς was wanted, εἰδητικὸς ἀριθμὸς might very naturally suggest itself ”. The three Aristotelian passages in 
which εἰδητικὸς ἀριθμὸς occurs are: Metaph. 1086 a 2–10, 1088 b 30–35, 1090 b 32–36 (Wilson 1904: 257). Wilson 
(1904: 257) also notes that “εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ would be a convenient formula for Idea-numbers as opposed to 
numbers in the ordinary sense, and may therefore have come to be the equivalent of Idea-numbers with them, 
and it should be noticed that the plural εἰδητικοὶ  ἀριθμοὶ (…) never seems to occur in Aristotle but only the 
singular collective εἰδητικὸς ἀριθμός” . 
20  All references to the text of Syrianus’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics are to the page and line 
of the Berlin Academy Edition (CAG VI,1) and follow in general outline the translation by Dillon & O’Meara 
(2006). See Syrian. 121, 11–14.
21  Syrian. 121, 14–21.
22  Syrian. 121, 21–24.
23  Syrian. 121, 27–31.
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of them in the case of mathematical number. He further clarifies in his comment on the 
same passage that if we are to say anything also about the difference or lack of difference 
between units, one must not on any account assign quantitative units to the essential 
numbers.24 But since those who maintain the existence of essential numbers speak of 
immaterial25 units, according to Syrianus we have to assert that all these units differ from 
one another by reason of otherness and are indistinguishable in virtue of sameness, and 
exhibit the combination of these characteristics, because both of these genera of Being 
pervade everything.26
In his comment on the Aristotelian passage 1082 a 32–b 1, Syrianus explains the rela-
tion between the eidetic number and the unit. He states again that the number of the 
Forms (ho tōn ideōn arithmos) is not unitary (monadikos), even if it is called a unit; it is 
a number as being a pure form (eidos), assimilating to itself those things that participate 
in it, but a unit as being the measure (metron) and the prior measure (prometron) of the 
forms which exist in the soul and in nature and in sense-objects.27 In my opinion, Syri-
anus seems to construe here the eidetic number, considered as a unit, as the paradigmatic 
cause of the rest of the Forms. Furthermore, in trying to answer Aristotle’s objection 
expressed in passage 1082 a 32–b 1, he points out that in any case, according to those who 
support the existence of separate eidetic numbers, Forms are not composed of Forms, 
and all the arguments provided by Aristotle are more suitable to a comedian than to 
someone who investigates serious matters.28
III. Syrianus’s classification of number
In passage 1080 b 11–14 Aristotle states that some hold that both kinds of number exist, 
that which involves priority and posteriority being identical with the Forms, i.e. the 
Form-number, and mathematical number being distinct from Forms and sensible things, 
but both kinds of number being separable from sensible things.29 According to Syrianus, 
it is obvious that in Aristotle’s view, Plato belongs to this category. Moreover, Syrianus 
invokes Aristotle’s commentator Alexander, who asserts this interpretation. Pseudo-Al-
exander verifies that Aristotle refers to Plato who postulated the existence of both kinds 
24  Syrian. 121, 38–122, 3.
25  I do not think that it is necessary to accept Kroll’s suggestion of aulous for MSS autous, but 
Dillon & O’Meara (2006: 198, note 206) accept it. 
26  Cf. Syrian. 122, 3–9; I paraphrase somehow.
27  Syrian. 134, 23–26.
28  Syrian. 134, 26–29.
29  Translation by Dillon & D. O’ Meara (2006).
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of number, the Form-number or eidetic number and the mathematical number.30 Syri-
anus accepts that Plato says this, but not only this, adding that Plato postulated the exis-
tence of both kinds of number, i.e. of eidetic number, the Forms having an order within 
it, and also mathematical number, which is superior to physical number, but inferior to 
eidetic number, in the same way as Soul is superior to Nature, but secondary to Intellect.31 
What we can infer from the words of Syrianus is that, according to his acceptance of the 
platonic tradition, he recognizes three kinds of number: the eidetic, the mathematical 
and the physical. The mathematical number is intermediate and corresponds to the Soul, 
which is also intermediate between Nature and Intellect. Consequently, the physical 
number corresponds to Nature and eidetic number to Intellect (Nous).
IV. Syrianus on the sorts of mathematical number
We can deduce how Syrianus understands on the one hand mathematical number and on 
the other, the relation between mathematical and eidetic number, from his comment on 
passage 1080 b 21–23 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In this passage Aristotle states: “Some-
one else says that the first kind of number, Form number, is the only kind, and some say 
that mathematical number is the same as this.”32 Syrianus notes that may be this thinker 
viewed all kinds of number as being present in the eidetic number, those prior to it as it 
were proceeding into manifestation in it, while those subsequent to it are present in it as 
in their paradigmatic cause.33 
At this point it would be useful to consider what kind of number could be prior to the 
eidetic number, especially if prior here means superior. This could be a plausible mean-
ing of prior, since we can understand that subsequent here means inferior and imitative. 
If eidetic number operates as a paradigmatic cause, then it is superior in comparison 
with those numbers present in it. Indeed, we can detect here a conversion of the typi-
cal platonic relation between eidos-paradeigma and its exemplifications or imitations or 
images. While the Platonic Form as paradeigma, considered on an onto--logical level is 
a common characteristic which is somehow present in all its examples inasmuch as these 
exist, and these exist since they participate in it, in this case the examples are present in 
the paradigmatic cause. 
Kroll puts in a bracket the following sentence from Syrianus’s comment on passage 
1080 b 21–23: “this is the only sort of number and it is absolutely transcendent, and math-
30  Ps.-Alex. In Metaph. 745, 20–32. Dillon & D. O’Meara (2006: 198, note 207) note that this allusion of Syri-
anus to Ps.-Alexander’s commentary is significant for indicating the relation between them, and their common 
dependence on Alexander; see also Dillon & O’Meara (2006: 8–11).
31  Syrian. 122, 11–16.
32  Translation  by  Annas (1976; repr. 1999).
33  Syrian. 123, 13–15.
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ematical number is the same as this”. According to Syrianus, what Aristotle says here 
is that some wished to eliminate mathematical number in its general accepted sense, 
while they postulated the existence of only one class of number, the eidetic number, and 
the very same number was called by them mathematical number. Syrianus34 proceeds 
to an interpretation of this view, saying that mathematical number is of two sorts, the 
one unitary (monadikos) and the other substantial (ousiōdēs). He adds that the substan-
tial number is that by means of which the Demiurge is said to put in order the rational 
soul. He then explains that these thinkers did not think it reasonable to call “eidetic” the 
number which is acknowledged by the general public to be non-substantial, but that 
number which substantially exists in our souls and which by its innate power (autophuōs) 
generates unitary number, while not identifying it with eidetic number, they neverthe-
less did not disdain to call it “eidetic”, in the same way as we are accustomed to call the 
intermediate reason-principles in the soul “forms”.
Based on these words by Syrianus, we can infer that he recognizes two sorts of math-
ematical number, the unitary and the substantial, the latter being this which is substan-
tially present in our souls and by means of which our rational soul has been ordered and 
structured by the Demiurge. Moreover, the latter is the efficient cause which by its innate 
power generates unitary number. In my opinion the reason why Syrianus mentions this 
division is to show that the thinkers which Aristotle refers to in passage 1080 b 21–23, do 
not in fact identify eidetic number with mathematical number, since they do not even 
identify it with the substantial mathematical number. They just call the latter “eidetic” 
number, but this is just a homonymy. This time Syrianus seems to draw a parallel not 
between mathematical number and the soul, but between substantial mathematical 
number and the intermediate reason-principles of the soul.
V. Syrianus on the ontological status of mathematical number
In terms of the structure and ontological status of the constituents of each mathematical 
number, Syrianus sets forth his views in his comment on the Aristotelian passage 1082 
a 15–26. In my opinion, in this passage Aristotle poses two questions. In the first, he 
asks how is it possible that a number, e.g. two, can be a definite entity existing over and 
above the units of which it is constituted, namely over and above the two units in this 
example, and similarly with the other numbers? Aristotle offers two solutions to this 
problem; this can be either by participation of the one in the other, e.g. as “white man” 
exists besides “white” and “man”, because it partakes in these concepts; or when the one 
is some differentia of the other, as “man” exists besides “animal” and “two-footed”.35 The 
second question raised by Aristotle concerns the explanation of the unity of the units 
34  Syrian. 123, 19–25.
35  Translation  by Dillon & O’Meara (2006).
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within each number. He states that some things are one by contact, others by mixture, 
and others by position, but none of these alternatives can possibly apply to the units of 
which two and three consist.36
Regarding the first question raised by Aristotle, Annas notes that the Aristotelian 
argument here appears to suggest that, “The Platonists just present us with a collection 
of units, and a collection is not an entity over and above its members”. Moreover, she 
points out that this is a simply anti-platonist point, and that Aristotle adds examples to 
show that it is not limited to units.37 Syrianus demonstrates in his Commentary that the 
argument implied within the first Aristotelian question (1082 a 15–20) intends to dispute 
the existence of separable numbers, but divine numbers are not an easy target. Accord-
ing to Syrianus, “the objection is not relevant to divine numbers at all; for these are not 
unitary in such a way that we may ask in their case what each of them is over and above 
the units composing them” (transl. Dillon & O’Meara).38 
Regarding the second question posed in the Aristotelian text (1082 a 20–26), Annas 
notes that the original question is, “How can a number like two be a unity, on this option? 
It fails all the conditions Aristotle accepts for a thing’s being a genuine unity”.39 It is obvi-
ous that by using the words, “all the conditions Aristotle accepts”, Annas means contact, 
mixture and position, i.e. the conditions Aristotle mentions in this passage. But are these 
indeed all the conditions Aristotle accepts for a thing to be a genuine unity? J. Annas 
states that the aforementioned question seems to be a development of a single elliptical 
sentence at 992a 1–2: “why is a number, when taken all together, one?”.40 In my opinion, 
this problem is raised twice in a more serious and decisive way in book H of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, where it is associated with the more general ontological problem of the unity 
of both substance and definition. 
In the passages H 3, 1044 a 2–6 and H 6, 1045 a 7–8, Aristotle poses the question of 
the unity of number in connection with the problem of the unity of definition. In the 
first passage he states that, “…a number must be something in virtue of which it is a unity, 
though people cannot now say what it is that makes it so, if indeed it is. (For either it is 
not, but is like a heap, or it is, and then it should be explained what it is that makes it one 
out of many)”.41 In the second passage and generally in chapter H6, Aristotle returns to 
this problem in order to focus on the matter of the unity of definition.42 In this chapter he 
36  Aristotle adds that just as two men do not constitute any one thing distinct from both of them, so it must 
be with units too; the fact of their being indivisible will make no difference; points are indivisible also, but still 
two of them do not make up anything over and above the two; translation by Dillon & O’Meara (2006).
37  Annas (1976; repr. 1999: 171–172).
38  Syrian. 132, 4–6.
39  Annas (1976; repr. 1999: 171–172).
40  Annas (1976; repr. 1999:172).
41  Translation  by  Bostock (1994).
42  As Bostock (1994: 279) puts it: “Aristotle opens his discussion with the general principle that whenever 
a thing has parts, but is not to be identified with the sum of those parts, then there is always  a cause of its unity”; 
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elaborates on the theory that a definition is a unity because the definiendum is a unity.43 
Furthermore, he offers a solution to the problem of the unity of definition by using as his 
strongest argument the unity of matter and form. In fact, as Bostock puts it, he comes to 
see the unity of matter and form as somehow providing a definite solution to the much 
wider problem of the unity of predication.44 According to the exegesis of pseudo-Alex-
ander, matter and form both have an innate capacity to be one.45 
Returning to Syrianus, we see that he considers the above mentioned objections irrel-
evant to the divine numbers; not only the first Aristotelian objection, that expressed in 
his first question (1082 a 15–20), but also the second, included in passage 1082 a 20–26. 
So he chooses to answer this second objection, which is related to the cause of the unity 
of number, with respect to mathematical number because he believes it is more proper-
ly directed against mathematical number.46 This means that he interprets the unity of 
each divine number as indisputable, so refusing even to discuss the matter. But the most 
striking aspect is that Syrianus attempts to answer the question as to the unity of math-
ematical number, by following a hylomorphic approach. This means that he chooses to 
oppose the Aristotelian viewpoint by using its own weapons. If the mathematical number 
is constituted of matter and form, then it can be a unity, because matter and form have 
an innate capacity to be one.
Syrianus addresses Aristotle and states: “since we see that in each thing, according 
to you also, there is one element that is like matter and another like form, so also in the 
Five, the five units and in general the quantitative element and the substratum come to 
numbers from the Dyad, whereas the form, as represented by the Five, comes from the 
Monad”.47 Syrianus continues by saying that every Form is itself a monad and defines the 
underlying quantity, and so the Five is itself a sort of monad, because it proceeds from 
the ruling Monad, and it both gives form to the quantity subject to it, which was hitherto 
formless, and binds it together to its own form.48 
V 1. Syrianus on the principles of mathematical number
Syrianus argues that there are two principles of mathematical number existing in our 
souls, from which the whole of the mathematical number is born. The first principle is 
the monad, embracing within itself all the Forms of the numbers and being analogous to 
a heap (sōros)  is given as a typical instance of something that is just the sum of its parts.
43  Cf. Bostock (1994: 279)
44  Bostock (1994: 288–289).
45  Ps.-Alex. In Metaph. 521, 8; see also Mouzala (2008: 87).
46  Syrian. 132, 6–7.
47  Syrian. 132, 7–10.
48  Syrian. 132, 11–14.
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the Monad in the intelligible realm. The second principle is the dyad, which constitutes 
a sort of potency that is generative and formless and of infinite power. Because of these 
characteristics this second principle assumes the role of an image of the inexhaustible and 
intelligible Dyad and it is for this reason that we call it the “indefinite dyad”.49 The next 
passage from Syrianus shows that the two principles operate in a complementary way 
during the process of generation, because the dyad runs over all things and the monad 
constantly articulates and structures and adorns unceasingly with forms and puts in order 
whatever proceeds from the dyad, since this is always just an indefinite quantity.50
We see here that there is a strong affinity between this theory of principles of numbers, 
in its general outline, and what Aristotle testifies about the platonic theory of principles 
in his Metaphysics passage 987 b 18–27. In this passage it is said that, since according to 
Plato, the Forms were the causes of all other things, he thought their elements were the 
elements of all things. Aristotle adds that according to Plato, the numbers are derived 
from the Great and the Small by participation in the One, and that it is peculiar to him 
to posit a dyad and construct the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the 
infinite as one, as the Pythagoreans did.51 
Alexander in his Commentary explains that Plato’s view was that the Forms are the 
principles of the other things, and since the Ideas are numbers, the principles of number 
are principles of the Ideas. Moreover, Plato said that the principles of number are the 
unit and the dyad and that the One is principle of all things.52 Given that there are in 
numbers both the One and that which is apart from the One, and the latter is represented 
by the many and the few, the dyad is the first thing apart from the One, containing within 
itself both manyness and fewness; manyness and fewness are reduced to the double and 
the half, and these are in the dyad.53 Again, thinking he was proving that the equal and 
the unequal are the principles of all things, according to Alexander, Plato assigned the 
equal to the unit and the unequal to excess and defect; for inequality involves two things, 
a great and a small, which are respectively excessive and defective. Alexander states that 
it is for this reason that Plato also called it the “indefinite” (aoristos) dyad, because neither 
of the two, neither that which exceeds nor that which is exceeded, is, of itself, limited 
(hōrismenon), but indefinite and unlimited. Alexander adds that when the indefinite dyad 
has been limited by the One, it becomes the numerical dyad. This kind of dyad is one in 
49  Syrian. 132, 14–20.
50  Syrian. 132, 20–23.
51  I follow the translation  by Ross (The Internet Classics Archive), in general outline.
52  Alex. In Metaph. 56, 3–8. All references to the text of Alexander’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
are to the page and line of the Berlin Academy Edition (CAG I) and follow in general outline the translation by 
Dooley (1989).
53  Alex. In Metaph. 56, 8–13. 
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form;54 and the dyad is certainly the first number and its elements are the One and the 
great and the small.55
At this point it would be useful to consider the differences between Alexander’s and 
Syrianus’s explanation of the principles of numbers. Alexander56 points out that the prin-
ciples of numbers are the monad and the indefinite dyad, and that the latter after being 
limited by the One becomes the dyad in the numbers, and this is the first number and its 
principles and elements are the One and the great and the small. On the other hand, Syri-
anus asserts that the principles of mathematical numbers are the monad, which embraces 
within itself all the Forms of the numbers and is analogous to the Monad in the realm of 
intelligibles, and the dyad which is an image of the inexhaustible and intelligible Dyad. 
This dyad is also called “indefinite”, but this is just a homonymy. So it seems that Syrianus 
duplicates the principles with regard to the mathematical numbers, since the principles 
of mathematical numbers are only “images” of-or analogous to-the real principles of 
numbers.57 Apart from this, the characteristics which Syrianus ascribes to his “indefinite 
dyad” are different to those which Alexander chooses to focus on and analyze in order to 
describe the original indefinite dyad, that which Syrianus refers to as “the inexhaustible 
and intelligible Dyad”. 
On the one hand, Alexander is more interested in justifying and explaining why the 
dyad as a principle is called “indefinite”. For this reason he focuses on its structure and 
the special characteristics of its elements; specifically, on the characteristics of that which 
exceeds and that which is exceeded, namely on the indefinite and unlimited character of 
excess and defect, since these are the two elements of the indefinite dyad. On the other 
hand, Syrianus seems to select and highlight characteristics which are more compatible 
with the role and ontological character of the Aristotelian matter (hulē), since his own 
“indefinite dyad” is described as a potency that is formless and of infinite power.58 Despite 
this, the fact that it is characterized as a generative potency makes it a more active and 
efficient principle than the Aristotelian matter (hulē). 
54  Alex. In Metaph.  56, 13–21. 
55  Alex. In Metaph.  56, 21–22; 56, 31–33. 
56  Alex. In Metaph.  56, 7–8; 22–33. 
57  Sheppard (1982: 2–4) points out that Syrianus expounds his view of the monad and the dyad  at a number 
of places in the “Metaphysics” Commentary. The fullest exposition of his view appears at 112. 14 ff., but there are 
also important expositions at 129. 4ff.; 131. 34ff.; 160, 18–19; 169. 2ff. In the first passage Syrianus states that the 
two principles, here called a monad and the dyad “infinite in power”, come immediately after the transcendent 
One and they are causes of the things as a whole; they reappear at every level of beings. Sheppard (1982: 2–3) 
notes that Syrianus distinguishes between this transcendent monad and dyad on the one hand, and on the other 
hand the αὐτομονὰς and the αὐτοδυὰς which appear in the realm of Forms; she further pinpoints that it is not 
always clear when Syrianus is talking about the monad and the dyad only in relation to numbers, and when he is 
talking about the supreme cosmic principles (1982: 4). She adds that ῾second᾿ and ῾third᾿ versions of the monad 
and the dyad, as principles of the universe, would be the lower causes analogous to these principles (1982: 4).
58  Cf.  Arist. Phys. 192 a 25–34; 207 a 25–26; Metaph. 1036 a 8–9; 1037 a 27.
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Moreover, Alexander’s explanation emphasizes the relationship between the indefi-
nite dyad and its elements which are basically mathematical concepts. These include the 
many and the few, in turn reduced to the double and the half, to the unequal, to the great 
and the small, and finally to that which exceeds and that which is exceeded, i.e. to excess 
and defect. Alexander also stresses in his explanation the contrariety between the indef-
inite dyad and the One, when referring to their primary opposing characteristics. As he 
points out, according to Plato the One is indivisible but the dyad divided, and the unit is 
associated with the equal but excess and defect, the elements of the dyad, are associated 
with the unequal. Alexander’s explanation reminds us of what Aristotle testifies in his 
Physics about the old traditional view of the philosophers, that the One and excess and 
defect are principles of all things.59 
Conversely, Syrianus emphasizes the cooperation or synergy between the monad 
and the indefinite dyad during the process of generation of numbers. Moreover, his 
terminology reminds us of the way in which Aristotle describes matter and form, i.e. as 
the two constituents of every substance which are complementary to one another.60 He 
also focuses on the analysis of the relationship between the principles of mathematical 
numbers and the original principles, i.e. the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad which are 
principles in the realm of intelligibles; for the principles of mathematical numbers exist 
in our souls, so they are distinguished from the latter.
V 2. Syrianus on the structure of mathematical number
Syrianus clarifies that number Five is a unity, but the unity of Five is not due to the condi-
tions Aristotle accepts for the genuine unity of a thing in the passage 1082 a 17–21. This 
is because Five is neither constituted from substance and accident, nor yet from genus 
and differentia, nor by five units being in contact with each other, nor by being mixed 
together, nor by submitting to being placed in certain position.61 Furthermore, from what 
Syrianus states in passage 132, 33–34, we can infer that he makes a distinction between 
numbers and countable objects (arithmēta). In the case of countable objects Syrianus 
accepts that there is nothing over and above the individual objects, although he points 
59  Alex. In Metaph.  56, 12–18;  cf. Arist. Phys. 189 b 11–16.
60  Syrianus refers to the “indefinite quantity” (132, 21) and “unstructured quantity” (132, 26) which is artic-
ulated and structured and formed (132, 22); cf. the word ἀρρύθμιστον (132, 26) of Syrianus with the same word 
used in Arist. Phys. 193a11. See also Phys. 192a 13-25, where Aristotle describes the relation between matter and 
form as the relation between feminine and masculine; within this philosophical frame hulē (matter) has a strong 
desire for eidos (form).
61  Syrian. 132, 29–33.
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out that according to Plato, countable objects receive the different numbers by virtue 
of participation in some Form, and he invokes passage 101c of the Phaedo at this point.62
Syrianus asserts that it is not because numbers are composed of indivisible units that 
they have something other than those units, but because there is something in them anal-
ogous respectively to matter and to form. He then attempts to explain the structure and 
the elements of each mathematical number using as an example number seven. Accord-
ing to Syrianus, when we add three to four and make seven, we express what we are doing 
in these terms, but our statement is actually not true. The mathematical number seven 
is constituted of the Form of Seven (heptas) and a substratum; the units when joined 
together with the other units make up the substratum of the number seven, so number 
seven is made up of this quantity of units and the Form of Seven (heptas).63 According to 
Syrianus, even though in mathematical number seven the seven units never exist inde-
pendently of the Form of Seven, yet the seven should be described by the science that 
sets out these things to be something composite, containing one element analogous to 
Matter and substratum, another to Form and structure.64 
But if we accept that there is a substratum and a Form applied to it, this raises the 
following question concerning the efficient cause. What is it, then, that applies the Form 
of Seven to the units? Syrianus answers this question by drawing a parallel between 
the soul of the carpenter (psuchē tektonikē) and the soul of the mathematician (psuchē 
arithmētikē). What is it that applies the Form of Bed to such and such a combination of 
pieces of wood? The soul of the mathematician, by possessing within itself the originative 
Monad, imposes form upon, and generates, all numbers, as the soul of the carpenter, in 
virtue of possessing the appropriate art, imposes form on bits of wood for the making of 
a bed. But there is a difference inasmuch as there is a difference between the arts. The art 
of carpentry does not exist in us by nature and needs the handicraft, since it is concerned 
with sense-perceptible matter, while the art of arithmetic is both naturally inherent in us 
(which is why it is possessed by all), and is concerned with a kind of matter which is the 
object of discursive intellect (hulē dianoētē65). It is for this reason that it is able to shape it 
both easily and timelessly.66
Furthermore, Syrianus draws a distinction between all the units underlying math-
ematical numbers and the one which is principle to all of them, i.e. the Monad. Accord-
ing to this distinction all the units underlying numbers are undifferentiated, apart from 
62  Syrian. 132, 33–38. In this passage of the Phaedo Socrates assures his interlocutors that the only, i.e. the 
true, cause of becoming  two is participation in the dyad.
63  Syrian. 132, 38–133, 7. 
64  Syrian. 133, 26–29.
65  Mueller (2000: 78) points out that the phrase ῾ dianoetic matter᾿ is an hapax ; cf. Syrian. 186, 30–32, where 
the commentator states that to the mathematical numbers we grant, if not such matter as is present in the natural 
world, yet at least mathematical matter (hulē mathematikē), as the quantitative element which underlies them 
(tēn hupobeblēmenēn posotēta).
66  Syrian. 133, 9–15. 
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that one, i.e. the Monad, which is the first principle and fount and mother of all. Exactly 
because all the Forms actually proceed from it into all numbers, it is far from needing 
anything to impose form on it.67 Syrianus traces two kinds of homonymy; the many units 
in the mathematical number are homonymous with the Monad, but also the definite 
dyad among the mathematical numbers is homonymous with the Indefinite Dyad. The 
Indefinite Dyad is the first principle of all number, but particularly of the even, while the 
definite dyad is a principle in a different way, not as being generative, but rather as we say 
that the first part of any thing is its principle as an element of it.68
In passage 1082 b 1–5 Aristotle states that in general, making units different in any way 
is absurd and strained (plasmatōdes), and he adds that by “plasmatōdes” means “forced in 
order to fit one’s assumptions”.69 He then points out that we can see that one unit differs 
from another neither in quantity nor in quality. Syrianus praises Aristotle, noting that 
this is well said with regard to the units which make up any (mathematical) number; 
for neither will the units differ in quantity, since all are minimal, nor in quality, for they 
are formless.70 Aristotle then explains in passage 1082 b 5–11, that a number must be 
either equal or unequal and that this distinction applies to all numbers, but especially to 
unitary number. Syrianus also praises Aristotle for this statement, saying that equality 
and inequality runs through all number, whether natural or supernatural or mathemat-
ical. But according to Syrianus, what is most important in Aristotle’s statement is the 
admission and clear confirmation of the doctrine of the ancients, that not all numbers are 
unitary. Syrianus states that from this one can infer that nothing has been demonstrated 
to us about non-unitary numbers, since Aristotle has based all of his arguments on the 
assumption of units.71
Especially important to us is Syrianus’s comment on the Aristotelian passage 
1082 b 7–11, from which we can gain further insight as to his view on the relationship 
between the sets of the units which make up any mathematical number and the mathe-
matical number as a whole. In this passage Aristotle defines the equal number and then 
states that things which are equal and entirely undifferentiated, we assume to be iden-
tical in the sphere of number, otherwise not even the twos in the original Ten will be 
undifferentiated, though they are equal.72 The question Aristotle raises at the end of this 
passage implies that if one maintains that they are undifferentiated, one has to provide 
an adequate reason in defense of this view. Annas suggests that in this argument there 
is a rather dubious slide from talk of numbers being equal to talk of what is equal in 
numbers. According to her interpretation, Aristotle’s aim is to show that the difference 
67  Syrian. 134, 29–33.
68  Syrian. 134, 33–135, 3.
69  I follow the Annas’ translation (1976; repr. 1999).
70  Syrian. 135, 5–6.
71  Syrian. 135, 9–14.
72  Partly I follow the translation by Dillon & O’Meara (2006)  and partly Annas’ (1976; repr.1999).
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between numbers cannot be a difference in the units, and tries to do so by showing that 
sameness of number entails sameness of units in the number.73
Nevertheless, Syrianus again praises Aristotle for his remarks concerning the multi-
plicity of units and for the assumption that not only are units undifferentiated, but also 
numbers that are equal to one another. He then answers Aristotle’s question by provid-
ing the reason why not only are units undifferentiated, but also sets of units within each 
mathematical number. For example, three would be just one thing, even though it is 
taken many times in making up thirty, for what are equal within the realm of numbers 
are identical.74 He then justifies why the dyads in the decad are also undifferentiated. 
They are undifferentiated not just because their units are undifferentiated, though this 
is also the case, but because their Form is one. Moreover, its unity is due not to having 
given itself to undifferentiated subjects, for it makes only one single dyad numerically, but 
to having proceeded from the original Monad and remaining itself purely one.75 So the 
cause of the lack of difference among the dyads within the decad is their Form which is 
one and the same for every set of two units.
Syrianus stresses that even if we ourselves granted that the decad was made up of five 
dyads, exactly as it has ten units, it would have been necessary to agree that, while there 
are many dyads numerically, all these are one in form. He further clarifies two things 
about the decad: a) the dyads do not make up the decad because they have been put 
together, since the Forms of numbers are simple and proceed from the Monad, and this is 
also the case with the decad; b) the units underlying the dyad, being extended further, do 
not become the substratum of the decad, which proceeds from its own originating prin-
ciple and brings about number Ten after being combined with the substratum. For these 
two aforementioned reasons, according to Syrianus, we are not compelled to postulate 
numerically many dyads, in order not to convert numbers into countables (arithmēta).76
Syrianus points out that if there were many dyads, as Aristotle himself asserts, and 
many triads and many decads, then generally each of the unitary numbers would be many 
and infinite, and it would have also been necessary that mathematical number as a whole 
would not be one, but there would be infinitely many mathematical numbers.77 Syrianus 
strongly objects to this hypothesis, assuming that since mathematical number is universal, 
there seems to be just one. Consequently and each particular mathematical number must 
be one, in order that the total composed out of these may also remain one.78 Moreover, he 
notes that if someone claims that the total mathematical number exists in infinite multi-
plicity like the individual things that are one only in form (ta homoeidē tōn kath’ hekas-
73  Annas (1976; repr.1999: 172).
74  Syrian. 135, 16–19.
75  Syrian. 135, 19–23.
76  Syrian. 135, 23–32.
77  Syrian. 135, 32–136, 3. 
78  Syrian. 136, 3–6.
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ta), we will refer back once again to the single Form which mathematics examines; and 
we will find, according to Syrianus, one single Form of the total mathematical number, 
embracing a single Dyad and a single Triad and not many of them, in order that the total 
number will not become once again multiple, and this proceed to infinity.79
Furthermore, Syrianus explains that when we investigate the way in which the dyad 
relates to the decad, we need to avoid understanding this relationship as if the decad had 
been divided into or composed of five dyads. Instead of saying that we will divide the 
decad into five dyads, we should rather say that we take five times the subject-matter of 
the dyad. Nor do we compose the decad of five dyads, in order not to present its Form as 
being composite, something we cannot even see happening within sensible forms in the 
realm of Nature. At the end of his comment on passage 1082 b 7–10, Syrianus states that 
in general we do not say that number is multiple as being divided in accordance with its 
subject-matter, but rather that each number exists so as to have manifold instantiations, 
if we intend to preserve it in its pure status as a number and not make it a countable.80
VI. Syrianus’s presentation of the mathematical number
The crucial problem that emerges from Syrianus’s presentation of the mathematical 
number is the point Mueller stresses. If the dyad is a form and it is realized five times 
within the example of the decad, then “it seems that we can no longer speak of mathe-
matical numbers differing ῾from forms in that there are many alike, while the form itself 
is in each case unique:᾿  the mathematical numbers are themselves unique”.81 According 
to Mueller “Syrianus places so much emphasis on numerical forms or logoi that he ends 
up identifying mathematical number with substantial number, leaving monadic number 
with no significant independent role.”82 
Lernould also notes that the insertion of a formal element, of a formal cause, in the 
monadic number, in a sense brings about the conversion of this number into an eidetic 
number. This would tend to diminish the distinction between the monadic and the eidet-
ic number, inasmuch as one can say that the seven of the mathematician, considered as 
form, as heptad, exists separately from the monads which constitute part of its composi-
tion.83 Another objection is that the analysis of number five into matter and form seems 
to mean that we isolate five units as matter of the number, and this would certainly imply 
that number five exists already before its form comes to be applied to the units of the very 
same number. This analytical process could lead to a regression to infinity, if we assume 
79  Syrian. 136, 6–11.
80  Syrian. 136, 11–17.
81  Mueller (2000: 79).
82  Mueller (2000: 75).
83  Lernould (2009: 152).
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that the matter which constitutes the five units is also composed of matter and form, i.e. 
of the heptad, and so on to infinity.84 A relevant objection is that the five units which 
constitute the matter of the mathematical number are not supposed to be a completely 
indeterminate matter, a matter which is appropriate for receiving any kind of form and 
becoming any number; according to this reasoning, that matter must be considered as 
a kind of draft, as a foreshadow of number five, so again we have to explain a kind of 
pre-existence of number five before number five comes to existence, i.e. before the matter 
of this number receives the form of pentad.85 
In my opinion, all of the answers to the above questions and objections are implied 
within the very explanation of the nature of mathematical number given by Syrianus. 
He stresses that the majority of people have been fooled into thinking that seven is noth-
ing else besides the relevant number of units.86 Put differently, Syrianus argues that the 
majority of people wrongly believe that the multiplicity of units, i.e. the relevant number 
of units, is a sufficient explanatory cause of the existence and constitution of numbers. 
Furthermore, we can add that most people think that mathematical operations suffice 
to explain the causes of generation and existence of numbers and this is what Socrates 
blames for their failure to understand the real causes of numbers and all things in passage 
96 e–97 c of the Phaedo. Also, Syrianus’s view is that the error of the majority of people 
is due to the common but unwarranted assumption that mathematical operations can 
be considered as the only, i.e. the true, explanatory causes of the existence of numbers.87
Burnyeat points out that although the question, “what are the οὐσίαι and principles 
of the things that are?” is not a question in the philosophy of mathematics, the Platonists’ 
answers invoke mathematical themes when they are asked for the most general principles 
of explanation.88 According to the Platonic view, the causes of generation and existence of 
numbers lead us to the causes of Forms, i.e. to the causes of all other things, since Forms 
are the causes of all other things and pure Forms are not separate from numbers.89 Forms 
can be conceived of as numbers inasmuch as they operate as causes, which in a sense 
means that we can count them as measures for their effects, since they endow things that 
participate in them with order, beauty and unity.90 
In my view it is clear that Syrianus tries to answer the Aristotelian question about the 
causes of the separate existence of numbers, by providing also a solution to the problem 
84  Lernould (2009: 148)
85  Lernould (2009: 148).
86  Syrian. 133, 16–17.
87  Cf. Mueller-Jourdan (2009: 166–167).
88  See Burnyeat (1987: 216); Burnyeat refers to the passages Λ 1, 1069 a 33–36 and  Μ 9, 1086 a 21 ff.; 
moreover, he notes that the Platonists’ answers, not the question, are responsible for MN’s  focussing on math-
ematical themes.
89  See again Syrian. 121, 30–31.
90  O’Meara (1989:135) points out that Syrianus “understands the relation between Forms and numbers in 
a ῾Pythagorean᾿ way: ideal numbers represent a Pythagorean way of  speaking of Forms”, since by referring to 
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of the unity of number. Both these questions have an ontological character. He choos-
es to answer Aristotle’s question regarding the justification of the unity of number by 
adopting a hylomorphic approach of mathematical number, namely by using the very 
same philosophical and methodological weapons of Aristotle. Syrianus proceeds to the 
analysis of the mathematical number into matter and form, and this solution permits 
him to apply the Platonic thesis of the separate existence of numbers to the mathemat-
ical or monadic numbers themselves.91 However, we must take into consideration that 
he manages to do this only by combining a basic Aristotelian ontological doctrine, and 
what is more, a doctrine which concerns sensible substances, with the Platonic tradition 
of the separate existence of numbers, and this procedure entails to a certain degree the 
Platonic modification of the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism, so as to conform to 
the Platonic Ontology. 
Within this frame of reference, Syrianus clarifies that the units of mathematical 
number are only its substratum or matter, which can never exist independently of the 
form of the number,92 and that all mathematical operations, addition, subtraction, divi-
sion and multiplication, apply only to the substratum, i.e. to the units.93 The cause of 
being of each mathematical number is its form, which coincides and is identified with 
its formal cause. Number seven owes its existence to the Form of Seven (heptas), since 
the seven units are not yet number seven, before the application of the Form of Seven 
to them. It is crucial for us to understand that according to Syrianus it is the science of 
mathematics which describes each mathematical number as something composite and 
that the constituents of mathematical number are just analogous respectively to matter 
and form.94 From this analogy emerges the cause of the unity of mathematical number; 
the unity of mathematical number is analogous to the unity of every composite in the 
realm of nature, since matter and form both have an innate power to be one (autophuōs 
hen95). So, from these remarks we can infer that the analysis of the mathematical number 
into matter and form is primarily presented by Syrianus as a knowledge-theoretic neces-
sity, or an epistemological postulatum. This reflects the need of mathematics to analyze 
number into its constituent elements in order to interpret and understand its ontological 
status, since its composition and the way in which its elements are related to one another 
determine its ontological structure and value. This thesis of Syrianus reminds us also of 
Forms as numbers the Pythagoreans expressed through mathematical analogy significant ontological features 
of Forms; see Syrian. 103, 15–104, 2; 134, 22–26; 137, 7–9.
91  Cf. Lernould (2009: 151).
92  Syrian. 133, 26–27.
93  Syrian. 133, 4–7; 134, 14–19; 135, 25–28; 136, 11–15; 136, 27–36.
94  Syrian. 133, 3–4; 133, 27–29; see also Lernould (2009: 149, note 47).
95  See above note 45.
186 Melina G. Mouzala  / University of Patras /
the method Aristotle proposes and uses for the study of natural things within the frame-
work of the science of Nature in his Physics.96
Syrianus points out in his comment regarding passage 1084 b 20–23, that taken by 
itself, each of the units of a mathematical number exists potentially and not in actuality, 
both in truth and according to the doctrine of the ancients.97 Moreover, he adds that if 
number is not a heap (sōros) of units, but each one, while being made up of a definite 
number of underlying units, is constituted in accordance with the Form proper to itself, 
the unit within a number would be nothing in actuality, before it was given order by the 
Form proper to it.98 Here again we can trace the influence of Aristotelian thought on 
Syrianus’s argumentation, since it is Aristotle who claims in passage 1039 a 3–14 of his 
Metaphysics, that it is impossible for a substance to be composed of substances present 
in it in actuality. For what is in actuality two things cannot also be in actuality one thing, 
though a thing may be one and at the same time potentially two. Therefore, if a substance 
is one thing, it cannot be composed of substances present in it.99 Aristotle in the same 
passage refers to number as a representative instance of this ontological situation, saying 
that if number is, as some suggest, a synthesis or combination of units, either the number 
two is not one, or there is no unit present in it in actuality; for actuality is the cause of 
the separate existence of each substance and it is the factor which separates substances 
from each other.100 
It is worthwhile mentioning that Radke, taking into consideration the constitution 
of mathematical number proposed by Syrianus, draws a distinction between the math-
ematical number and the monadic number and identifies the latter only with the matter 
of the mathematical number. Furthermore, within this line of interpretation the monad-
ic number is associated with the multiplicity, while the mathematical number with the 
unity.101 This interpretation seems to contribute to the reinforcement of the platonic 
conception of mathematical number adopted by Syrianus, while also conforming to Syri-
anus’s tendency towards a combination of basic Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines, since 
Radke does not abandon the Aristotelian hylomorphic approach but exploits it in order to 
amplify its usefulness to the explanation of Syrianus’s understanding of the mathematical 
number. This is obvious when Radke also asserts that the form is the constituent which 
distinguishes each specific mathematical number from the others, while its matter is the 
component which characterizes its being in general a number.102
96  See Arist. Phys. 184 a 10–16.
97  Syrian. 152, 2–5.
98  Syrian. 152, 5–10.
99  Translation Bostock (1994).
100  On this matter  see also Ps.-Alex. In Metaph. 525, 40–526, 27; Asclep. In Metaph. 432, 8–27.
101  Radke (2003: 523).
102  Radke (2003: 518).
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Syrianus prompts us to take due note of this, that Aristotle is neither willing to accept 
that number is a system of units,103 nor acknowledges that units are anything at all in 
actuality, until they are brought to order by Forms.104 Mueller argues that according to 
Syrianus, the Euclidean multiplicities are not real numbers105. Furthermore, he notes that 
Syrianus, “has abandoned the Euclidean conception of numbers as arbitrary multiplici-
ties of monads for a conception in which mathematical numbers are forms possessed by 
such multiplicities, forms which are generated sequentially from an originative monad”.106 
This last thesis, according to Mueller, proves that here Syrianus clearly has the neo-Py-
thagorean conception of number in mind.107 
I agree with Mueller that in Syrianus’s conception of number we can partly trace 
a neo-Pythagorean influence, at least in terms of the sequential generation of forms of 
numbers from an originative monad. But on the other hand he seems to praise Aris-
totle for rejecting the view expressed by Theon of Smyrna, that number is a system of 
monads. I also agree that Syrianus abandons the Euclidean multiplicities of monads 
or units, on the grounds that they are not real numbers, because it is easy for them to 
become numbered things, i.e. countables (arithmēta), instead of being numbers.108 Muel-
ler is correct when he recognizes as one kind of motivation for this abandonment of the 
Euclidean conception of number, the thesis that a multiplicity of monads by itself is only 
a heap (sōros) and not a unified thing.109 Another reason for the abandonment of the idea 
that numbers are collections of monads or units, is the assumption that since monads are 
undifferentiated, one can easily reach the conclusion that there is only one monad, the 
monad itself. Consequently, the difference between number seven and number five is 
not quantitative but formal. Seven is not more than five because it contains more monads 
than five; seven and five are just different forms.110
Mueller takes into consideration Proclus’s approach, according to which the monad, 
unlike the point, is without position, since it is immaterial and outside all extension and 
103  This reference of Syrianus reminds us of the definition of number offered by Theon of Smyrna: 
“A number is a system of monads or a progression of multiplicity which proceeds from the monad and a retro-
gression ending in the monad” (Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato, 18, 3–5); cf. Nicom. Introduction to 
Arithmetic, I 7, 1–2; this definition is also ascribed to the neo-Pythagorean  Moderatus of Gades; see Stob. Anth. 
I 8, 1–11. Mueller (2000: 75) takes the first part of the above mentioned definition to be equivalent to Euclid’s: 
“A number is a multitude composed of units” (Euclid’s Elements VII, Def. 2); he also thinks, as Dodds does,  that 
the second part of this definition, which labels neo-Pythagorean, is closely related to proposition 21 of Proclus’s 
Elements of Theology. 
104  Syrian. 152, 8–10.
105  Mueller (2000: 79).
106  Mueller (2000: 81).
107  Mueller (2000: 80).
108  See Syrian. 132, 33-34; 135, 28-32; 136, 15-17; Syrianus distinguishes between monadic number and the 
number of numbered things.
109  Mueller (2000: 81).
110  Mueller (2000: 81).
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place.111 Based on this assumption, he suggests that monads cannot be differentiated 
because of their lack of position.112 In my view, this is not a sufficient justification of the 
fact that the units of mathematical number cannot be differentiated, because the eidetic 
numbers are differentiated although they also lack position. According to Aristotle,113 the 
eidetic numbers exhibit serial order, and they have an ordering relation based on prior-
ity and posteriority; but we can understand that this priority and posteriority is neither 
temporal nor local, because Forms are dissociated from time and place. Mathematical 
numbers, unlike eidetic numbers, do not exhibit serial order. Mueller explains this differ-
ence as follows: “since there is one ideal two, three, and four, the ideal three has a unique 
predecessor and successor whereas an arithmetic three does not since there are infinitely 
many arithmetic twos and fours”.114 In my opinion this is a reasonable explanation. 
Many years before Mueller, Wilson and Cherniss offered another plausible explana-
tion. Wilson explains in this way “τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον”: “ The Ideas of numbers, 
as being the Universals of number and therefore ἀσύμβλητοι, are as ἀσύμβλητοι entirely 
outside one another, in the sense that none is a part of another. Thus they form a series 
of different terms, which have a definite order…”.115 Cherniss suggests that Aristotle’s 
own scattered remarks make it possible to see how Plato conceived the differentiation 
of these quantitatively indifferent numbers. He explains that, “because they are inadd-
ible and so entirely outside of one another in the sense that none is part of any other, 
these ideal numbers stand to one another in the relation of prior and posterior; and this 
relation is the serial order, two-three-four and so forth…What distinguishes each of the 
ideal numbers from all the rest is its position in this series…”.116 What we must carefully 
note here is that the “position in this series” is a matter of order rather than a matter of 
real position in place. Cherniss correctly stresses that this order is not one of ontological 
priority.117 This assumption is connected with Aristotle’s testimony that the Platonists 
111  Procl. In Eucl. 95, 23–96, 11.
112  Mueller (2000: 81).
113  See again Arist. Metaph. 1080 a 17–18.
114  Mueller (1986: 114). Cf. Burnyeat (1987: 237, n. 61). Mueller correctly stresses that Aristotle uses the 
idea of priority and posteriority to contrast one kind of congeries of units, idea numbers or eidetic numbers, with 
another, intermediate, i.e. mathematical, number.
115  Wilson (1904: 253). Wilson (1904: 253–254) clarifies that the mutual exclusiveness of the eidetic 
numbers, caused by their being ἀσύμβλητοι (incomparable), enables them to form an ordered series or a serial 
order, whereas the inclusiveness of one number in another in the mathematical number  prevents it from having 
the prior and posterior; see 1080 a 30–33.
116  Cherniss (1962: 35).
117  Cherniss (1962: 36). Klein (1992: 89–93) construes in a different way this taxis (order) of eidetic numbers. 
According to Klein, the very formulation of the possibility of the koinōnia tōn eidōn (or of genōn) indicates the 
arithmos structure of the genē; within this framework the eidē form assemblages of monads, i.e., arithmoi of 
a peculiar kind. The assemblages of eidē, the arithmoi eidetikoi, cannot enter into any “community” with one 
another; their monads  are all of different kind and can be brought together only partially, namely only insofar 
they belong to one and the same assemblage. Klein explains that the notion of an “arithmetic” structure of the 
realm of ideas permits a solution of the ontological methexis problem. The arithmoi eidetikoi, according to him, 
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did not posit a general idea of number, precisely because numbers stand to one another 
as prior to posterior.118
In my view, the main motivation behind Syrianus’s treatment of mathematical 
number was to display the existence of two different natures within this number, one 
formless and the other formal, and to set out the conception of the formal and efficient 
cause of mathematical number.119 The proximate efficient cause of mathematical number 
is the substantial mathematical number by which the Demiurge has structured our 
rational soul and which by its innate power generates the unitary number. And since 
the substantial mathematical number exists within our soul it is totally clear that it is 
distinct from the eidetic number. Although it is also called “eidetic number”, it must 
not be confused with the real eidetic number. But the properly said efficient cause of 
the mathematical number is the arithmetic soul, which by possessing within itself the 
originative monad imposes form upon all numbers and in this way generates all numbers.
Arithmetic soul produces mathematical numbers from two principles that it possesses 
within itself, and from which the whole of the mathematical number is born, the monad 
and the dyad. It is worthwhile to consider what the relationship is between the substan-
tial mathematical number and the two principles. Since the substantial mathematical 
number has been given to the rational soul by the Demiurge, it is prior to the unitary 
number, but it must also be prior to these two principles which exist within our souls, or 
at least comprehensive in relation to them, for two reasons. Firstly, the soul possesses 
within itself these two principles, whereas the substantial mathematical number has been 
given to the soul from without by the Demiurge, and only to the rational soul. Moreover, 
the substantial mathematical number seems to represent the mathematical structure 
and the well-ordered constitution of the soul; part of this structure and constitution are 
are intended to make intelligible the inner articulation of the realm of ideas; they define each eidos ontologically 
as a being which has multiple relations to other eidē in accordance with their particular nature and which is never-
theless in itself altogether indivisible. Klein points out that for Plato the “numerical” being of the noēta means 
their ordered being, their taxis; this taxis of eidetic numbers is logically expressed in the relation of “being supe-
rior” or “inferior” in the order of eidē; the higher the genos, i.e., the less articulated the eidetic number, the more 
original and comprehensive it is. So Klein traces a superiority and inferiority within this taxis of eidē, because he 
understands this taxis within the frame of the koinōnia tōn eidōn; the monads which constitute an eidetic number, 
i.e., an assemblage of ideas, are nothing but a conjunction of  eidē which belong together to one and the same 
eidos of a higher order, namely to a “class”, a genos.
118  See Arist. NE 1096 a 17–19; cf. Arist. Metaph. 999 a 6–9. For the dissolution of a misunderstanding of 
the first passage see Wilson (1904: 247–248). Wilson clarifies its meaning saying  that the Platonists held that the 
Ideal numbers had no one Idea of number corresponding to them as a group; i.e, there was no “Idea” correspond-
ing to number in general. Klein (1992: 93) explains that every eidetic number is either “superior” or “inferior” in 
this order with respect to its neighbor, so that a subsumption of all these numbers under one idea common to all, 
namely “ number in general”, is quite impossible. Cherniss (1962: 36) states that Aristotle himself generalized 
this principle referred to in the passage of NE, and used it to refute the existence of ideas which Plato certainly 
posited. Cherniss asserts that “as soon as the essence of each idea of number is seen to be just its unique position 
as a term in this ordered series, it is obvious that the essence of number in general can be nothing but this very 
order, the whole series of these unique positions”. His conclusion is that  the idea of number in general, then, is 
the series of ideal numbers itself. He further points out that to posit an idea of number apart from this would be 
merely to duplicate the series of ideal numbers.
119  I think the most important passage which strongly supports this interpretation is Syrian. 133, 17–26.
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obviously these two principles. Secondly, these two principles, the monad and the dyad, 
from which we generate mathematical numbers, are not original principles but are in fact 
images of the first principles and pre-contain all of the formal features of mathematical 
numbers;120 the first is only analogous to the Monad in the intelligible realm, while the 
second is an image of the Indefinite Dyad which is intelligible. 
There is one final extremely important question regarding the ontological status of the 
mathematical number. Radke claims that since mathematical numbers admit mathemat-
ical operations and these operations always and necessarily concern the particulars, we 
can reach the conclusion that whereas the eidetic number is something universal,121 the 
mathematical number is a kind of particular.122 I do not agree with the idea that the eidet-
ic numbers are simply universals, because the platonic Forms are not simply universals; 
nor do I agree with the view that the mathematical number is a kind of particular. We 
have seen that Syrianus (135, 32–136, 11) supports the view that any given mathematical 
number is just one, for it is a universal, and also that there is only one single Form of the 
totality of mathematical number. From Syrianus’s words we can assume that the total-
ity of mathematical number (the mathematical numbers as a whole) is one single Form, 
although composed of all the mathematical numbers, each being considered as a unique 
universal. If the mathematical numbers were infinitely many, then the science of math-
ematics could not exist.123
In my view, the totality of mathematical number needs to be conceived as a universal 
in the sense of comprehensive and unique, since there is only one such series, consisting 
of universals each of which is unique.124 Each particular mathematical number is a univer-
sal in the sense of unique, unrepeatable or unreproducible, and prior. If we multiply and 
repeat many times the form, i.e. this constituent which defines and gives existence to 
the mathematical numbers, then we would be compelled to convert them from numbers 
into countables. On the grounds of this assumption one could definitely attribute to the 
mathematical numbers the status of a separate existence. Given that the status of separate 
existence is primarily acknowledged to the eidetic numbers,125 there remains only one 
120  O’Meara (1989: 133).
121  Radke (2003: 524). According to Radke, the eidetic number is also composite, but its matter, which is 
genuinely appropriate to its form, has also the status of universal.
122  Radke (2003: 523, 528).
123  Syrian. 136, 6–8; see also Radke (2003: 526).
124  Cf. Wilson (1904: 253).
125  The Phaedo (96 e–101 d) attests that a separate idea of each number is posited by Plato and that partici-
pation is the way in which the multiplicities of  numbers are related to each  ideal-number. Ideal-numbers are not 
combinations or congeries of units, but each idea is a perfect unity, a simple and unique unity which is irreducibly 
itself and nothing else, just as is every other idea; see Cherniss (1962: 34) and Tarán (1981: 14). The latter (1978: 
83; 1981: 15–16) claims that ideal numbers are the hypostatization of the series of natural numbers. Cherniss 
(1962: 34) suggests that “once it is recognized, however, that the ideas of numbers are not aggregates of units at 
all but are the universals of number, each of which is a perfect and unique unit without parts, the phenomenal 
numbers which are aggregates can be related to them as images or imitations”. Nevertheless, Cherniss stresses the 
difficulties which are involved in the idea that particular numbers fall short of their models and invokes passage 
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solution to the question of the difference between these two kinds of number. While 
eidetic numbers are not constituted of units, the mathematical numbers are monadic 
or unitary, i.e. they have a quantitative or material substratum which represents their 
monadic or unitary aspect; but what defines and determines their being is their form, 
which has the status of a Platonic Form. This means that according to Syrianus’s view, 
we can construe mathematical number as a synthesis of the eidetic and the monadic 
or unitary number. Its eidetic aspect betrays an entirely Platonic approach, whereas its 
monadic or unitary aspect reveals the Aristotelian hylomorphic conception of it. Conse-
quently, we can recognize in Syrianus’s interpretive analysis of the mathematical number, 
a complete synthesis of the Platonic and Aristotelian Ontology. We can also assume that 
he receives and transmits the Platonic tradition, while in parallel inserting in it funda-
mental innovations of Aristotelian origin. 
As it concerns the epistemological status of mathematical knowledge, I believe that 
Mueller126 is correct that in passage 133, 10–15 Syrianus presents arithmetical knowledge 
as something which exists a priori in our souls, since it is innate and inherent in the very 
structure of the soul. I also believe the same is true for passage 123, 19–23 of Syrianus’s 
Commentary. According to him, the science of arithmetic inheres in us by nature, so it 
belongs to the souls of all people, and has dianoetic matter, so that it can give form to 
the matter easily and timelessly. This thesis verifies that mathematics is not invented but 
a priori (in the sense that it has been given to our souls), universal and necessary;127 and 
with this status it can henceforth play a considerably creative role in the production of 
our knowledge. 
432 a–b of the Cratylus in order to highlight this problem. Wilson (1904: 253) also states that the Ideas of numbers 
are the Universals of number. Mueller (1986: 112–113) admits that “Plato may have well thought that numerical 
universals were numbers” but raises the question as to what the relationship between these numerical forms or 
ideas and real (i.e. “natural”) numbers is. In any case Mueller (2000: 82) is correct when he points out that the 
above mentioned passage of the Phaedo seems to have played the most significant role in Syrianus’s treatment 
of number. I agree that this passage seems to have significantly affected all of the Platonists, since it is the most 
important evidence of the platonic thesis on the separate existence of numbers.  
126  Mueller (2000: 78). The two principles of mathematical numbers also exist in our souls, according to 
Syrianus, and play a role not only in number psychology, epistemology and  the explanation of our number 
judgements, as Mueller (2000: 77) correctly stresses, but more generally in the way the soul conceives  of a wide 
range of phenomena and noēta (intelligibles) associated with numbers. 
127  O’Meara (1989: 134).
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Syrianus on the Platonic Tradition of the Separate Existence of 
Numbers
This paper analyzes and explains certain parts of Syrianus’s Commen-
tary on book M of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which details Syrianus’s 
response to Aristotle’s attack against the Platonic position of the sepa-
rate existence of numbers. Syrianus defends the separate existence not 
only of eidetic but also of mathematical numbers, following a line of 
argumentation which involves a hylomorphic approach to the latter. 
He proceeds with an analysis of the mathematical number into matter 
and form, but his interpretation entails that form is the constituent of 
number, which has the status and role of a Platonic Form. This solution 
allows him not only to explain and justify the unity of number, but also 
to apply the Platonic thesis of the separate existence of numbers, to 
the mathematical or monadic numbers themselves. It also betrays its 
tendency to combine theses of the Platonic Ontology with fundamental 
Aristotelian doctrines.  
Syrianus, Neoplatonism, Plato, Aristotle, eidetic number, mathematical 
number, monadic number
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